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COMMENT
CAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SURVIVE IN EDUCATION?
PART I. INTRODUCrION
In 1964, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 19641 making it
unlawful to discriminate against an individual based on race, sex,
creed or color. Over thirty years have elapsed since the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was enacted, yet minorities and women still experience
the same discrimination the Act was intended to prevent.2 In order to
combat this ongoing discrimination, many courts, employers, and in-
stitutions of higher education have instituted affirmative action plans
that give preferential treatment to groups that have traditionally been
discriminated against.'
Affirmative action refers to deliberate steps taken by businesses,
employers, individuals, and colleges and universities "to promote
equal opportunity and to ensure that discrimination [based on race,
gender, etc.] will not recur."4 "The goal of affirmative action is to
eliminate all non-legal barriers to equal employment opportunity, in-
cluding intentional discriminatory practices and non-intentional
(structural or systematic) discrimination."5
This comment will focus on the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion plans used by colleges and universities, which include race-based
scholarships to certain minority students. The constitutional issue of
these affirmative action plans arises when the colleges and universities
receive federal funds. Institutions that receive federal funds are sub-
ject to the restrictions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6
Part II of this paper will provide the history of affirmative action as
it has evolved since The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. Part III
of this paper will focus on affirmative action plans in the educational
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982). This Act is commonly referred to as Title VII.
2. See, Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1986 and
1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673 (1985); Maxine N. Eichner, Getting Women's Work That Isn't
Women's Work Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Tile VII, 97 YALE LJ. 1397
(1988).
3. BRON R. TAYLOR, AFFIMATIVE AcrIoN AT WoRK: LAW, PoL.TIcs Am ETHIcs 11
(1991).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). This is commonly referred to as Title VI.
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setting under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, part IV
will discuss recent cases in Texas and Maryland that have dealt with
the issue of Title VI and affirmative action and examine the potential
effects of these decisions on affirmative action plans at colleges and
universities across the United States.
PART II. THE HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACION
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
"The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "Title VII") definitively
prohibits discrimination in voting, public accommodations, public edu-
cation, and employment."7 Title VII also provided for the establish-
ment of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(hereinafter "EEOC"). The role of the EEOC is to ensure that pri-
vate employers comply with the requirements of Title VII. The EEOC
accomplishes this by assisting plaintiffs in initiating complaints of dis-
crimination, handling mediation between plaintiffs and employers,
and supporting litigation initiated by plaintiffs.8
In the years following the enactment of Title VII and the creation of
the EEOC, there appeared to be a unified attempt around the country
to promote the use of affirmative action plans to put an end to dis-
crimination. First, in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Exec-
utive Order 11246 which required federal contractors to "take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color, religion, or national origin." 9
In 1971, six years after President Johnson's executive order, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Griggs v. Duke Power.10
This was the first time the Supreme Court was asked to interpret Title
VII. In this case, the Court held that Duke Power's requirements for
employment, which included a high school diploma and the passing of
a standardized general intelligence test, where neither was shown to
be significantly related to job performance, were prohibited under Ti-
tle VII where they operated to exclude minority groups from
employment.1"
In Griggs, African-American employees of Duke Power brought
suit claiming Title VII violations. These employees challenged the
company's policy that required employees to have a high school di-
ploma in order to be employed in all departments except its labor
7. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 19.
8. Id at 20.
9. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 5 C.F.R. 720 (1965).
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11. Id
2
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department."2 Not only was the labor department the only depart-
ment where African-Americans were allowed to work, it was the only
department which did not require a high school diploma.'3
Duke Power lifted this hiring restriction on African-Americans in
1965 (the same year Title VII became effective). However, at the
same time, Duke Power added a requirement that employees have a
high school diploma to transfer between departments. This new re-
quirement effectively prohibited African-Americans from employ-
ment in the other departments because most lacked a high school
education. Prior to 1965, transfers between departments were based
strictly on job seniority. 14 After 1965, however, in addition to requir-
ing a high school diploma, Duke Power required employees to pass
two aptitude tests in order to be eligible for employment in all depart-
ments except the labor department.' 5
The Supreme Court found that neither of these aptitude tests al-
lowed Duke Power to predict future job performance of its employ-
ees.' 6 The Court also found that the test requirement operated to
exclude African-Americans from employment at a disproportionate
rate, and thus was prohibited under Title VII.17 In making its deci-
sion, the Supreme Court looked to the intent of Congress. The Court
found that "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII
was plain from the language of the statute. Congress intended to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove barriers
... favor[ing] an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees."'"
It is important to note that the Supreme Court also rejected the
lower court's interpretation that "the Act (Title VII) only covered in-
tentional discriminatory conduct after the Act became effective in
1965."'19 The Court stated that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be mani-
fested if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices. '20 This interpretation by the Court was essen-
tial if the Act was going to ensure that employers would not be able to
12. Id. at 427.
13. Id. Duke Power had five departments: labor, coal handling, operation, maintenance,
and laboratory. The highest paying job in the labor department was lower than any of the other
department's lowest paying salary.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 428. These tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical
Comprehension Test.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 429.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 430.
1996]
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hide discriminatory practices by arguing that their employment prac-
tices were not intended to discriminate; particularly when such prac-
tices worked repeatedly to exclude certain minority groups from
employment opportunities.
B. The Equal Employment Act of 1972
Following the lead of President Johnson and the Supreme Court of
the United States, Congress made amendments to Title VII in 1972.
By passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,21 Con-
gress gave the EEOC more power to enforce the regulations of Title
VII. This Act allowed the EEOC to actually initiate litigation for Ti-
tle VII claims instead of just being able to support litigation by issuing
right to sue letters to plaintiffs. These amendments to Title VII made
it clear that "Congress intended to improve the economic status of
blacks"22 by using affirmative action.
While President Johnson, the Supreme Court of the United States,
and Congress all showed approval of a movement towards the use of
affirmative action plans from 1964 to 1972, it was unclear whether pri-
vate employers could voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans until
the Supreme Court decided United Steelworkers of America v.
Weberl in 1979. The Supreme Court in Weber answered this question
when it held that a private employer could use affirmative action with-
out violating Title VII if the plan was justified by a manifest imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories. 24
In Weber, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) entered into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that included "an affirmative action plan
designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's then
almost exclusively white craftwork forces."'  The plan included re-
serving fifty percent of in-plant training programming positions for
blacks until the percentage of blacks employed by Kaiser equaled the
percentage of the black population in the Gramercy, Louisiana area.26
During the first year the plan was in place, Brian Weber filed suit
alleging that the plan violated the provisions of Title VII because it
21. 92 U.S.C. 261 (1972).
22. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 23.
23. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24. Id. at 197.
25. Id. at 198. Until this 1974 agreement, Kaiser only hired persons with craft experience.
Since so few blacks were able to gain experience in the field due to discrimination, blacks were
virtually excluded from Kaiser's work force.
26. Id. The percentage of blacks in the Gramercy area at this time was 39%.
4
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gave preferential treatment to blacks, thus discriminating against
Weber and other white employees because of their race.27
The district court held that Kaiser's plan violated Title VII, and
granted a permanent injunction that prohibited Kaiser and the USWA
from continuing to use the affirmative action plan.28 On appeal, the
district court holding was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,29 which reasoned that even if the affirmative action plan that
gave employment preferences to blacks was bona fide (a legitimate
attempt to end discrimination), the plan still violated Title VII's prohi-
bition against racial discrimination in employment.30
In reversing the district court and the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court of the United States found that the "purposes of the Kaiser-
USWA plan mirror those of the statute."31 Both Title VII and the
Kaiser plan were designed to put an end to past discrimination and to
open employment opportunities for blacks. 2 Specifically, the Court
held that "Title VII's prohibition... against racial discrimination does
not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
plans."33 For the first time, the Supreme Court made it abundantly
clear that private employers could use voluntarily adopted affirmative
action plans without violating the provisions of Title VII. As long as
the plan was designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination, the
Court would uphold the plan under Title VII. By reaching this con-
clusion, the Court sent the message that discriminatory practices must
come to an end. If employers were willing to take voluntary action
towards ending discrimination, the Supreme Court was willing to sup-
port these efforts.
The question of whether voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plans violated Title VII was again presented to the Supreme Court
eight years after Weber when the Court decided Johnson v. Transpor-
tation Agency, Santa Clara County, California.34  Once again, the
Court held that affirmative action plans, voluntarily adopted by em-
ployers, which effected a gradual improvement in the representations
of minorities and women in the work force, followed the intent of Ti-
tle VII's enactment, and thus did not violate Title VII provisions.35
27. Id. at 199.
28. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
29. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 226.
31. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
32. Id
33. Id.
34. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
35. Id.
1996]
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In Johnson, the plaintiff challenged the promotion of a female appli-
cant over him when gender was used as a factor in the promotion
decision.36 The Transportation Agency (Agency) had adopted an af-
firmative action plan that allowed consideration of the gender of a
qualified applicant when making promotions in job classifications in
which women had been significantly underrepresented in the past.3 7
Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC claiming a violation of Title
VII, alleging that he was denied a promotion because of his gender.
After the EEOC issued Johnson a right to sue letter, he filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia. The Agency was found to be in violation of Title VII. 3s
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's find-
ing that a Title VII violation had occurred and reversed the lower
court's order of retroactive promotion and pay raise to Johnson. 39
The court reasoned that the plan did not violate Title VII because it
"was a lawful effort to remedy an entrenched pattern of manifest im-
balance."4 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit.4 '
In making its decision, the Court again focused on Congress' intent
when it enacted Title VII. In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan
wrote "we must be mindful of this Court's and Congress' consistent
emphasis on the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of
[Title VII]."42 The Court then reasoned that "affirmative action
plan[s] that represent a moderate, flexible, case by case approach to
effectuating a gradual improvement in the representations of minori-
ties and women... [are] fully consistent with Title VII."43
The Supreme Court decisions in Weber and Johnson show that the
Court was willing to accept the use of affirmative action plans under
Title VII. Affirmative action plans arising out of conscious efforts to
remedy the effects of past discrimination by society as a whole were
repeatedly upheld under Title VII by the courts. When ruling on chal-
lenges to affirmative action plans, the Court correctly looked at Con-
gress' intent when it enacted Title VII. Congress intended to provide
minorities and women with a means to achieve the goal of ending
years of discrimination. The Supreme Court decisions in Weber and
Johnson are consistent with this goal.
36. Id. at 619. Both the plaintiff and Diane Joyce'applied for a promotion to road dis-
patcher for the Agency.
37. Il at 620-21.
38. This opinion is unreported.
39. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985).
40. Id. at 759.
41. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
42. Id. at 640. (citations omitted)
43. Id. at 642.
6
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C. Affirmative Action and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
When a challenge to an affirmative action plan is brought under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 the highest
level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny,45 is applied by the courts. This strict
judicial scrutiny analysis was established by the United States
Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.46 The first
prong of this test requires that the governmental proponent of an af-
firmative action plan show a compelling governmental interest in rem-
edying the present effects of its own past discrimination.47 The second
prong requires that the remedial measure be narrowly tailored to
meet its remedial goal.48
In Croson, the City of Richmond implemented an affirmative action
plan that required prime contractors who had been awarded city con-
struction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the con-
tract amount to Minority Business Enterprises (MBE's).4 9 This plan
was challenged by local contractors. The Court determined that both
prongs of this two-tiered strict scrutiny analysis had to be met in order
for affirmative action plans to be deemed constitutional when chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that
there must be some identifiable compelling governmental interest in
order to "smoke out illegitimate uses of race" ... and to ensure that
"the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegiti-
mate racial prejudice or stereotype."50
The Court found that the City of Richmond failed to meet the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court reasoned that the City of
Richmond failed to provide any evidence that it was involved in any
past discrimination in the construction industry.51 The Court stated
that "a [mere] lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs... stand-
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The amendment provides that all persons born or natural-
ized in the United States shall not have their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United
States abridged by any State, nor shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law;, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
45. In situations involving the deprivation of rights guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution, courts will apply the highest level of scrutiny and in order to be deemed constitutional,
there must be some compelling governmental interest that deserves to outweigh the rights of the
individual.
46. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
47. Id. at 497.
48. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 477. Minority Business Enterprises are businesses in which minorities make up
50% or more of the ownership.
50. Id. at 493.
51. Id. at 499.
1996]
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ing alone cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public
contracts ..... 52 In addition, "[any] generalized assertion that there
has been past discrimination in an entire industry cannot justify the
use of an unyielding racial quota, since it provides no guidance.., to
determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy and
would allow race-based [remedies] . . . limitless in scope and
duration."53
The Court found that the affirmative action plan also failed the sec-
ond prong of the strict scrutiny test,54 which requires that the reme-
dial measure be narrowly tailored55 to meet its remedial goal. The
Court determined that since Richmond's goal was to remedy the ef-
fect of past discrimination in the Richmond area, the plan was not
narrowly tailored since it entitled Black, Hispanic, or Asian entrepre-
neurs from all over the United States, not just in the Richmond area,
an absolute preference over other citizens.56 The Court also found
that there was "absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons, ' 57 and
including these groups in the plan "strongly impugns the city's claim
of remedial motivation."58 Because the Richmond plan failed to iden-
tify the need for remedial action in its procedure for awarding public
construction contracts, the plan was held unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59
D. Summary
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a movement
began in the United States to use affirmative action plans to put an
end to discrimination against minorities and women. In 1979, the
United States Supreme Court explicitly indicated that private employ-
ers could voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans without violating
Title VII, when such plans were necessary to remedy manifest imbal-
ances in traditionally segregated job categories. Once a Title VII vio-
lation is alleged, the proponent of an affirmative action plan need only
show that the plan is an attempt to remedy the effects of past discrimi-
nation by society as a whole.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 470.
54. Id. at 506.
55. Id. at 493. In order for the plan to be considered narrowly tailored, it must be found to
be the least intrusive on the rights of those affected outside the "preferred group."
56. Id. at 507-08.
57. Id. at 506.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 511.
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1996], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol22/iss2/4
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Once a plaintiff alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the proponent of the plan must then
pass the two-pronged strict scrutiny test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Croson. First, the proponent must show the affirm-
ative action plan is an attempt to remedy the effects of its own past
discrimination thus serving a compelling governmental interest. The
proponent must then show that this remedial plan is narrowly tailored
to achieve its remedial goal. Clearly, when the violation is alleged
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the proponent of an affirmative
action plan has a much more difficult burden to overcome than when
there is an allegation that Title VII is being violated.
PART III. AFFIATrIvE ACTION AND EDUCATION
Similar to public and private employers, colleges and universities
around the United States have also implemented a variety of affirma-
tive action plans to encourage minority enrollment at their schools.
These higher education institutions, like employers, have also been
subjected to several challenges to their affirmative action plans.
A. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In the educational setting, the constitutional challenge is usually
brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment60 and a statutory challenge is brought under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter Title VI).61 Title VI provides that
"[n]o person in the United States shall on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.62
The leading case in the area of Title VI and affirmative action is
Regents of University of California v. Bakke.63 In Bakke, a white male
applicant who was twice denied admission to the Medical School of
the University of California at Davis (hereinafter "Davis") filed suit
against Davis claiming violations of the California State Constitution,
Title VI, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 4
Davis instituted a special admission program effective for the class
entering in 1973. The program was designed to "increase the repre-
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; See also supra text accompanying note 44.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
64. 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976), affd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
1996]
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sentation of 'disadvantaged' students in each Medical School class." 65
In essence, the plan provided that sixteen of 100 spots in each entering
class would be reserved for disadvantaged minorities.66 The evidence
submitted to the Court indicated that students admitted under this
special admissions program in 1973 and 1974, the years that Bakke
was denied admission, scored significantly lower than Bakke in all cat-
egories used by Davis in making its admission selections.67 The record
also showed that although several white students requested that their
applications be considered under the special admission program, no
white students were admitted under the plan.68
The trial court found that Davis' program was unconstitutional, but
refused to order the university to admit Bakke. On appeal, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that,
although the program served a compelling state interest of integrating
the medical profession, the program was not the least intrusive means
of achieving this goal and as such, was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 The court
also ordered Davis to admit Bakke into the medical school.70
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the California
court's decision that the Davis program was unconstitutional, and or-
dered Davis to admit Bakke to the medical school. 71 More impor-
tantly, the Court reversed the lower court's ruling that race could not
be used as a factor in Davis' admission selections.7 2 This is important
because it shows the Court's awareness that the main reason for the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to assist minorities. If
employers and colleges had not taken race into account in such dis-
criminatory manner in the past, there would have been no need for
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, as our recent history and
even the present has shown us, race is still taken into account in a
discriminatory fashion in some instances.
Although neither the trial court nor the California Supreme Court
addressed the Title VI violations alleged by Bakke, the Supreme
Court felt it useful to look to this statute in making its decision. The
65. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272. (citations omitted). Not one of the opinions provides a com-
plete description of the special admission program as distributed by Davis with its admission
applications.
66. Id. at 274-75.
67. Id. at 277.
68. Id. at 276.
69. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976), affdin part,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
70. Id. at 1172.
71. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
72. Id. at 272.
10
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Court primarily focused on the legislative intent in enacting Title VI.73
In the opinion written by Justice Powell, the Bakke Court indicated
that "[e]xamination of the voluminous legislative history of Title VI
reveals a congressional intent to halt federal funding of entities that
violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the
Constitution."'74 The Court further noted that "[a]lthough isolated
statements of various legislators taken out of context, can be mar-
shaled in support of the proposition that [Title VI] enacted a clearly
color-blind scheme... [t]he problem confronting Congress [in enact-
ing Title VI] was discrimination against Negro citizens .... ,, As one
legislator emphasized in introducing the bill:
The bill would offer assurance that hospitals financed by Federal
money would not deny adequate care to Negroes.... It would assure
Negroes the benefits now accorded only to white students in programs
of higher education financed by Federal funds... . It would, in short,
assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Fed-
eral funds ....76
The Supreme Court concluded that "in view of [this] clear legisla-
tive intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifi-
cations that would violate the Equal Protection component of the
Fifth Amendment."77 Thus, Title VI challenges are held to the same
level of scrutiny as constitutional challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As we saw in Bakke and eleven years later in Croson, in
order for an affirmative action plan subject to Title VI regulations to
meet a constitutional challenge, the plan must be necessary to serve a
compelling state interest, and it must also be narrowly tailored to
achieve this goal.
B. Summary
The United States Supreme Court decision in Bakke implies that
affirmative action plans implemented by institutions receiving federal
assistance can be held constitutional under Title VI. However, when
these plans employ classifications based solely on race or gender, they
face a higher level of scrutiny than used with Title VII affirmative
action plans that are voluntarily adopted by private employers.
Under Title VI, not only must the proponent of the affirmative ac-
tion plan show some evidence of prior discrimination, but the discrim-
ination must be perpetuated by this particular college or employer. If
73. 110 Cong. Rec. 1519 (1964).
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284.
75. Id. at 284-85.
76. Id. (quoting Rep. Cellar, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor man-
ager of the legislation in the House) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 287.
1996]
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the college or employer is able to show this prior discrimination, it
must then show that the plan is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.
The proposed plan must be a "tight fit"'7 with the intended goals of
this particular proponent in remedying the present effects of past
discrimination.
PART IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EDUCATION TODAY
Two recent federal court decisions focused on affirmative action
plans in the higher educational setting. The first case involved white
students challenging an affirmative action plan implemented by the
University of Texas School of Law. The second case involved an His-
panic student's challenge to a scholarship program instituted solely for
the benefit of African-American students at the University of Mary-
land at College Park. Although the courts were presented with suffi-
cient evidence of past discriminatory practices by both institutions
that gave rise to some present effects of discrimination, both plans
were deemed unconstitutional by their respective courts.
A. Hopwood v. Texas
Since the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Bakke, several plaintiffs
have challenged affirmative action plans at colleges and universities in
the United States. More recently, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas decided Hopwood v. Texas.79 In Hop-
wood, white students who were denied admission to the University of
Texas School of Law filed suit to challenge the law school's affirmative
action plan giving preferential treatment to minorities. The students
alleged that the plan "discriminated against them by favoring less
qualified Black and Mexican American applicants ... through the use
of a quota system."80
In determining whether the affirmative action plan could survive
the two-tiered strict scrutiny test, the court first examined Texas' prior
discriminatory history to ascertain if there was a compelling govern-
mental interest that justified remedial measures. The court noted that
"Texas [had a] long history of discrimination against blacks and Mexi-
can Americans in public education that [was well documented]" 81 and
found that "the effects of the state's past de jure segregation 82 was
78. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,171 (1987) (listing factors considered by the
court when determining whether an affirmative action plan is a tight fit with the remedial goal).
79. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
80. Id. at 553.
81. Id. at 572.
82. BLACK'S LAw DICrONARY 425 (6th ed. 1990) (de jure segregation is segregation that is
intended or mandated by law).
12
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reflected in the low enrollment of minorities in professional schools,
including the law school." 3 Having found this strong evidence of
present effects of past discrimination, the court determined that the
law school's affirmative action program did serve a compelling gov-
ernmental objective.84
Next, the court examined whether the plan could survive the second
prong of the strict scrutiny test. The court concluded that the plan was
constitutionally infirm because of the school's method of making its
selection comparisons8 5 The plan failed because it did not afford each
individual applicant a comparison with the entire applicant pool, and
allowed some minority applicants to be admitted solely because of
race.8 6 The court held "this is the aspect of the procedure that is
flawed, and must be eliminated." 87 Although the court found there
was a compelling governmental interest to remedy the effects of past
discrimination in Texas, the law school's plan was not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its remedial goal.
Hopwood follows a long line of cases that challenged the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action plans under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.88 Courts have consistently applied the strict scrutiny
analysis used in Bakke and Croson to determine whether these plans
are constitutional. Recently, there has been a movement to abolish
affirmative action plans all together.8 9 Many individuals feel there is
no longer a need for preferential treatment for minorities because dis-
crimination is no longer present in the United States, and there are no
present effects from past discrimination. However, as the facts re-
vealed in Hopwood and in a recent Maryland case, Podberesky v. Kir-
wan,9° these beliefs could not be further from the truth.
83. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
84. Id. at 573.
85. Id. at 578-79.
86. Id. at 579.
87. Id.
88. See also Washington Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (white
college and law students challenged race-based scholarships under Title VI); Geir v. Alexander,
801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986) (challenge to racial quota preferring minority students); Davis v.
Haipem, 768 F. Supp 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (white student not admitted to State University of
New York Law School challenged affirmative action plan under Title VI and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
89. See Sonya Ross, Dole Bill Takes On Affirmative Action, Tim DuRHAM HERAL SUN,
July 28,1995, at A7. Over the past year, several articles have appeared in major newspapers and
legal magazines and journals that call for a complete prohibition against affirmative action in all
areas, including education. The Board of Regents of California recently abolished affirmative
action in state-run colleges and universities. In the author's opinion, much of this anti-affirma-
tive action has come about since the Republicans have gained control of Congress led by House
Speaker Newt Gingrich.
90. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
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B. Podberesky v. Kirwan
In Podberesky, Daniel Podberesky enrolled as a freshman at the
University of Maryland, College Park (hereinafter "University") in
1990.91 Before entering the University, Podberesky applied for two
different scholarship programs available at the University, The Ban-
neker Scholarship and the Francis Scott Key Scholarship.9 Since
Podberesky failed to meet the eligibility requirements for the Key
program, it will not be discussed in this comment.
The Banneker Scholarship was a four-year scholarship awarded to
African-American high school seniors based on merit.93 The scholar-
ship entitled the recipient to full tuition, room, board, and other
mandatory fees.94 At that time, the minimum eligibility requirements
to be considered for a Banneker scholarship were a 900 on the Scho-
lastic Achievement Test (SAT) and a 3.0 grade point average.95 This
program was implemented by the state of Maryland as part of a six-
year plan used by the State to bring its higher education institutions in
compliance with Title VT. 96 Because Podberesky was Hispanic, he was
not considered for the scholarship.
After being denied a scholarship, Podberesky ified suit claiming a
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 97 Podberesky
claimed that because he met all the academic requirements for a Ban-
neker scholarship, he was discriminated against because he was not an
African-American. 98 The University argued that this affirmative ac-
tion plan was implemented by the State, in conjunction with the Office
of Civil Rights, to bring the higher education system in Maryland in
compliance with Title VI.99 The school articulated that "[t]he aim of
the program was to increase the representation of historically under-
represented racial groups at public higher education institutions in
Maryland." 100
The district court granted summary judgment for the University,
and Podberesky appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 10 1 The court of appeals remanded the case for further find-
ings as to whether there was sufficient evidence of present effects of
91. Id. at 152.
92. Id.
93. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D. Md. 1991).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 367.
100. Id.
101. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
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past discrimination that required remedial measures.102 On remand,
the district court again found that the Banneker program was neces-
sary to remedy the effects of past discrimination, and that the plan was
narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. 10 3 The court found four pres-
ent effects of past discrimination, any one of which standing alone
would warrant remedial measures.' °4 These four present effects were:
1) the University's poor reputation in the African-American commu-
nity; 2) African-American underrepresentation at the University; 3)
low retention rate of African-Americans who did enroll; and 4) the
hostile environment towards African-Americans on the University's
campus.'0 5
Podberesky again appealed the district court's decision to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals, applying the
Croson strict scrutiny analysis,0 6 reversed the district court's decision.
The court first questioned whether a compelling governmental inter-
est in remedying the effects of past discrimination existed, and
whether this plan was narrowly tailored to meet its goal. It concluded
that the district court erred in determining that the University met its
burden of proof on both prongs of the strict scrutiny test.0 7
The court of appeals determined that in order "[t]o have a present
effect of past discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party
seeking to implement the program must.., prove that the effect...
[was] caused by past discrimination and [was] of sufficient magnitude
to justify the program." 0 8  The court looked at the present effects
articulated by the University to determine if these effects were actu-
ally present and warranted remedial measures.' 0 9
Of the four factors articulated by the University as providing evi-
dence of effects of past discrimination, the court of appeals deter-
mined that the lower court erred in finding that the first and fourth
factors, standing alone, gave rise to a compelling governmental inter-
est in seeking remedial measures." 0 The first factor was the Univer-
sity's poor reputation in the African-American community, and the
fourth factor was a racially hostile climate on the campus. The court
reasoned that "mere knowledge of [the] historical fact [of past dis-
102. Id. at 53.
103. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 83 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993).
104. Id. at 1076.
105. Id.
106. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the Supreme
Court adopted the plurality opinion of the Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1987).
107. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
108. Id. at 153.
109. Id. at 154.
110. Id.
1996]
15
Early: Can Affirmative Action Survive in Education
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1996
192 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:177
crimination by the University] is not the kind of present effect that can
justify a race-exclusive remedy.""' In addition, the court found no
connection between the hostile-climate effect and the past
discrimination. 112
The court also determined that the second and third factors articu-
lated by the University as effects of past discrimination, under-
representation and low retention rates, fell short of providing a
compelling governmental interest.1 3 However, the court of appeals
reversed the lower court's summary judgment on these two factors." 4
Podberesky offered evidence to show that these effects were the result
of economics rather than past discrimination." 5 Under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the facts must be considered in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party and cannot, as a matter
of law, be granted when there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Here, the evidence provided by Podberesky created a genuine issue of
material fact and thus, as a matter of law, summary judgment should
not have been granted.
Even though the court of appeals found the University's plan failed
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, it also determined that the
second prong was not met as well. The court found that the program
was not narrowly tailored because out-of-state residents were also eli-
gible for the Banneker scholarship." 6 In order to be narrowly tai-
lored, the court reasoned that the Banneker program should only be
available to African-Americans in the Maryland area.-1 7 In addition,
the court found that the program was geared towards attracting "high
achievers," and as such it was not narrowly tailored because "[h]igh
achievers, whether African-American or not, are not the group
against which the University discriminated in the past.""18
The court of appeals held that the Banneker plan was unconstitu-
tional." '9 In addition, the court ordered the University to remove the
African-American descent requirement for the Banneker scholarship,
and required the University to reconsider Podberesky's eligibility for
that scholarship. 20 The United States Supreme Court recently denied
writ of certiorari on this case. 2 '
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 155.
115. Id. at 156.
116. Id. at 158.
117. Id. at 159.
118. Id. at 158.
119. Id. at 162.
120. Id.
121. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
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C. Past Supreme Court Decisions on Affirmative Action
In making its decisions in cases involving affirmative action under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court always emphasized
the importance of looking to Congress' intent in passing the Act. In
Weber, the Court clearly indicated that affirmative action plans can
survive in the face of Title VII. In that decision, the Court specifically
stated that "Title VII's prohibition... against racial discrimination
does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans."'122
Some years later, the Supreme Court in Johnson indicated how im-
portant it was "[to] be mindful of the Court's and Congress' consistent
emphasis on the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of
[Title VII]. ' 12 3 Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Bakke indi-
cated that "[a]lthough isolated statements of various legislators taken
out of context, can be marshaled in support of the proposition that
[Title VI] enacted a clearly color-blind scheme... [t]he problem con-
fronting Congress [in enacting Title VI] was discrimination against Ne-
gro citizens .... ,,'1 As indicated in the opinions by the Supreme
Court and by the intent of Congress, the goal of Title VII and affirm-
ative action was to assist African-Americans in their battle against ra-
cial discrimination.
D. Analysis of the Hopwood and Podberesky Decisions.
In 1994, thirty years after the Civil Right Act of 1964 was passed
and fourteen years after the Bakke decision, our judicial system was
faced with deciding Hopwood and Podberesky. In both cases, the re-
spective courts properly determined that the application of the two-
pronged strict scrutiny analysis used by the United States Supreme
Court in Bakke was necessary. However, both courts erred to some
degree in their analysis and application of the facts to the strict scru-
tiny test.
1. Compelling Governmental Interest
In order to pass the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, the propo-
nent of an affirmative action plan must show a compelling governmen-
tal interest in remedying the present effects of its own past
discrimination. 25 The proponents of the affirmative action plans in
Hopwood and Podberesky both presented evidence of present effects
122. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979) (emphasis added).
123. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
124. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,284-85 (1978) (emphasis added).
125. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989).
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of past discrimination in higher education by their respective state.
Unlike the court in Podberesky, the Hopwood court found that the
University met the first prong of the Croson strict scrutiny test.
In Hopwood, the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas took notice of "Texas' long history of discrimination
against blacks and Mexican Americans in public education"'126 that
was well documented. It found that "the effects of the state's past de
jure segregation [were] reflected in the low enrollment of minorities in
professional schools, including the law school."'12 7 Noting Texas' long
history of discrimination, it is fair to say that more than a handful of
minority students had been turned away from this law school in the
past, not because of sub par academic qualifications, but simply be-
cause of the color of their skin. Given the magnitude of Texas' dis-
criminatory past, the court properly held that the law school's plan
was necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest of integrat-
ing Texas' educational system.
In Podberesky, the University also presented to the court competent
evidence of present effects of past discrimination. The discrimination
in Maryland's higher education system was similar to that found in
Hopwood because both states maintained racially separated school
systems. 12 In particular, the University of Maryland at College Park
articulated four present effects of past discrimination: poor reputation
in the African-American community, underrepresentation, low reten-
tion rate of African-Americans, and a hostile environment on the Uni-
versity's campus. 2 9
The Banneker program had been implemented by the State of
Maryland after the Office of Civil Rights determined that Maryland's
higher educational system was not in compliance with Title VII and
threatened to initiate formal proceedings against the University. 30
This determination came in 1980,131 over fifteen years after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed. The scholarship was part of an overall
plan to ensure that Maryland was in compliance with Title VII
regulations.
126. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 572 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 554. The court discussed Texas' long history of discrimination in higher education
against minorities and noted that the state constitution and statutes required separate schools.
See also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52,54 (4th Cir. 1992) (indicating the state of Maryland
maintained separated higher education institutions where blacks were limited to attending one
of four black colleges, Bowie State, Coppin State, Morgan State, and the University of Mary-
land, Eastern Shore).
129. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir. 1992).
130. Id.
131. 1I
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Podberesky argued there was no compelling governmental interest
requiring remedial measures because the present effects articulated by
the University were not due to discrimination, but to economic factors
such as unemployment and low paying jobs. 32 A more logical reason
for the school's poor reputation in the community would be that those
African-Americans who suffered from bad experiences at the Univer-
sity of Maryland relayed this information to others. In addition, some
of the unemployment and low wage positions in the African-Ameri-
can community could be attributed to discriminatory practices at the
University.
Where did this poor reputation come from? It did not arise due to
some low economic status as Podberesky would have us believe. It is
more probable that the poor reputation was gained from those Afri-
can-Americans who enrolled at the University in the past only to be
met with the hostile environment that lingered from past discrimina-
tory practices. This in turn would lead to fewer individuals attending
the University, and the school's lower retention rates for African-
American students.
The Podberesky court failed to examine the totality of the circum-
stances, which undoubtedly played a major role in the Hopwood deci-
sion. Maryland, as well as many other states, perpetuated a pattern of
discrimination against minorities long after the emancipation of
slaves. As noted by the court, this Banneker plan was implemented
by the State of Maryland only after a finding of noncompliance with
Title VI regulations promulgated by the Office of Civil Rights. The
Office of Civil Rights determined that for years African-Americans
had been denied employment, promotions, entrepreneurial opportu-
nities, and education in Maryland simply because they were African-
American. This is the type of discrimination Congress intended to
remedy in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Banneker
scholarship was just another means of accomplishing this goal. As the
Hopwood court and the United States Supreme Court have found,'133
present effects of past discrimination do give rise to a compelling gov-
ernmental interest which deserves remedial measures. Thus, the
Podberesky court erred in determining that the University failed to
meet the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.
It is important to note that the present effects articulated by the
University of Texas School of Law and the University of Maryland
were found in 1994, over thirty years after the passage of the Civil
132. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 156 (4th Cir. 1994).
133. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part stated, "We therefore conclude that
Davis' goal of admitting minority students disadvantaged by the effects of past discrimination is
sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admission criteria.")
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Rights Act of 1964. Those individuals who argue there is no longer a
need for affirmative action for minorities and women in our society
should take a closer look at the facts presented in Hopwood and
Podberesky.
2. Narrowly Tailored
The second prong of the strict scrutiny test requires that the reme-
dial measure be narrowly tailored to meet its remedial goal.134 In
both Hopwood and Podberesky, the affirmative action plans used race
conscious remedies in order to combat the effects of past discrimina-
tion in each state's higher education system. The University of Texas
plan gave preferential treatment to African-Americans and Hispanics,
while the University of Maryland plan gave preferential treatment to
African-Americans only. For the following reasons, both courts erred
in their determinations that these affirmative action plans were not
narrowly tailored to achieve their remedial goal.
In order to be narrowly tailored, the plan must have a "tight fit"
with the remedial goal. In Hopwood, the University of Texas' goal
was to combat the years of constitutional and statutory discrimination
perpetuated by the state against minorities in higher education. The
same was true in Podberesky, where the state of Maryland imple-
mented its plan in order to combat the effects of documented discrimi-
natory practices against African-Americans. In order to achieve these
goals, the only effective alternative was some type of race conscious
remedy. As the Supreme Court has consistently stated in decisions
regarding remedial measures for past discrimination, "racially neutral
remedies for past discrimination [are] inadequate where consequences
of past discriminatory acts influence or control present decisions."'135
In both the Hopwood and Podberesky cases, past discriminatory acts
influenced current decisions.
Although both courts held that the affirmative action plans were
not narrowly tailored, in neither case would a race-neutral solution
have been as effective as the plans implemented by the schools. The
district court in Hopwood did not provide any race neutral alterna-
tives that would justify its conclusion that the law school's plan was
not narrowly tailored. 36 One possible reason for this omission is that
no effective race-neutral remedy exists.
134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989).
135. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 503 (W.D.N.C. 1970);
Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); McDaniel v. Barres, 402 U.S. 39
(1971); North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
136. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994). The Hopwood court did not
provide any reasons to explain its decision that the law school's plan was not narrowly tailored
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In Podberesky, the court articulated two reasons why the Univer-
sity's plan failed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. First, the
court found the that Banneker plan was geared towards attracting
"high achievers," and as such, it was not narrowly tailored because
"[h]igh achievers, whether African-American or not, are not the
group against which the University [has] discriminated in the past."'1 37
This statement is equivalent to saying that African-Americans are
usually not high achievers, and that the plan, by seeking out "high
achieving" African-Americans, furthers a different objective than its
claimed remedy. It would appear that the court itself harbors some
stereotypical ideas regarding the intelligence of African-Americans.
The court's holding in Podberesky also implies that African-Ameri-
cans with good academic standing had been accepted on a regular ba-
sis by the University in the past. The facts, as they were presented,
indicate quite the contrary. The evidence depicted a pattern of blatant
racial discrimination against all African-Americans by the University,
regardless of grade point average and standardized test scores. One
can readily conclude that a number of "high achieving" students, who
happened to be African-American, were turned away by Maryland's
higher education institutions in the past simply because of their race.
The Banneker plan would have been an effective means for the Uni-
versity to achieve its remedial goal. The plan was narrowly tailored
because it was designed to attract quality African-American students,
a group that traditionally has been discriminated against.
The second reason supplied by the Podberesky court also fails to
support the conclusion that the Banneker scholarship was not nar-
rowly tailored. The court reasoned that because the University's goal
was to remedy the effects of past discrimination against African-
Americans in Maryland, the plan overreached its goal by allowing
out-of-state students access to the scholarship. 138 Once again, the
court's perception has gone awry.
Most universities attract individuals from across the United States
as well as abroad. Therefore, it is unlikely that the University had a
policy of discriminating against African-Americans from Maryland,
and not those from other states or countries. By allowing all African-
American students to apply for the Banneker scholarship, the Univer-
sity furthered its objective of remedying the effects of past discrimina-
tion against all African-Americans in Maryland's higher education
system.
because race may be the sole factor in admission of some minorities. The court felt this alone
made the plan unconstitutional.
137. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 158.
138. Id. at 159.
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It appears that the Podberesky court was determined to find the
Banneker Scholarship plan unconstitutional in any event. However,
the reasons articulated by the court simply cannot support such a con-
clusion. For hundreds of years, African-Americans have been dis-
criminated against solely because of their race. During this time,
whites in America have had an advantage in all aspects of life. If we
are ever to achieve equality among the races, the scales must be
tipped in favor of minorites for more than just a few decades. As the
late Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in his dissent in Bakke:
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we must now
permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in
making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, afflu-
ence, and prestige in America. For far too long, the doors to those
positions have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to become a filly
intergrated society, one in which the color of a person's skin will not
determine the opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing
to take steps to open those doors. I do not believe that anyone can truly
look into America's past and still find that a remedy for the effects of
thatpast is impermissible.139
Justice Marshall penned this statement seventeen years ago, yet the
wisdom of these words still holds today. Race neutral remedies can-
not effectuate the intended goal of Congress in passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. However, race conscious affirmative action plans
overcoming strict scrutiny are effective in bringing about a remedial
goal, and should never be deemed impermissible.
PART V. CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was clear
that its intent was to assist minorities in ending years of discrimination
in employment and education. It has been over thirty years since the
Act was passed, but the effects of past discrimination are still preva-
lent in our society. The use of affirmative action has been the single
most effective tool employed by businesses, schools, and individuals to
combat discrimination and its effects. The author would gladly wel-
come the day when individuals are judged not by the color of their
skin, but by their skills and qualifications. However, I do not believe
this will come about in my lifetime.
For those individuals who say there is no longer a need for affirma-
tive action, I can only point them to the Hopwood and Podberesky
cases. These decisions make it abundantly clear that even though
Congress outlawed discrimination in 1964, the effects of years of dis-
139. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,401-02 (1978) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
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crimination are still apparent some thirty years later. It is not my po-
sition that we should have blanket affirmative action in every city,
town, or state; however, there should be a case-by-case analysis to
determine if affirmative action is necessary. In situations like those
examined in Hopwood and Podberesky, affirmative action is clearly a
must. The white majority has had an overall advantage in the United
States for hundreds of years; therefore, the United States as a whole
should continue to take "affirmative" steps to completely close the
gap.
SHAWNA A. EARLY
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